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ABSTRACT 
When the United States puts a cap on carbon 
emissions as part of the effort to address the 
problem of global climate change, this will in-
crease the prices of fossil fuels, significantly 
impacting not only consumers but also local, 
state, and federal governments. Consumers can 
be “made whole,” in the sense that whatever 
amount the public pays in higher fuel prices is 
recycled to the public, by means of a cap-and-
dividend policy: individual households will come 
out ahead or behind in monetary terms depend-
ing on whether they consume above-average or 
below-average amounts of carbon. In this pa-
per, we consider policy options for “keeping the 
government whole,” too; that is, policies to en- 
 
sure that additional revenues to government  
compensate adequately for the additional costs 
to government as a result of the carbon cap. We 
compare the distributional impacts of two policy 
alternatives: (i) setting aside a portion of the 
revenue from carbon permit auctions for gov-
ernment, and distributing the remainder of the 
revenue to the public in the form of tax-free 
dividends; or (ii) distributing all of the carbon 
revenue to households as taxable dividends. 
The policy of recycling 100% of carbon revenue 
to the public as taxable dividends has the 
strongest progressive impact, yielding the big-
gest net monetary benefits for the largest ma-
jority of the people.s  
Key words: Global warming; fossil fuels; climate change; carbon permits; cap-and-dividend;  
cap-and-auction; cap-and-trade 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the United States moves to craft serious poli-
cies to tackle the problem of global warming, 
discussion is focusing on the impacts of a cap on 
total emissions of carbon dioxide from burning 
fossil fuels. Carbon permits will be issued up to 
the cap, the number of permits declining over 
time as the cap is gradually tightened. From an 
administrative standpoint, the most efficient way 
to accomplish this is to issue the permits “up-
stream” to the few hundred firms that bring fossil 
fuels into the nation’s economy at roughly 2,000 
locations – oil terminals, gas pipelines, coal 
mines – rather than issuing downstream permits 
to far larger numbers of end-users. 
A carbon permit system will raise the prices of 
fossil fuels throughout the economy, as the cap 
restricts their supply much as OPEC raises prices 
by cutting production. The effects will be felt by 
every household, but the price increases will hit 
low-income and middle-income families harder 
than more affluent households because they 
spend a higher fraction of their incomes on fuels.  
To protect the real incomes of American families, 
and to protect the carbon cap from the political 
backlash that otherwise is likely to result from 
substantially higher prices for gasoline, heating 
oil and electricity, one policy option that is gaining 
increasing attention is a “cap-and-dividend” sys-
tem in which revenues from the sale of permits 
are recycled to the public as equal per capita 
dividends. In an earlier paper, we analyzed the 
distributional impacts of such a policy and 
showed that the majority of American households 
would be net winners in monetary terms – receiv-
ing more in dividends than they pay in higher fuel 
costs – with the biggest benefits accruing to low-
income families (Boyce and Riddle 2007).1 
The price impacts of a carbon cap will be felt not 
only by consumers, but also by governments at 
the local, state, and federal levels. The prices of 
heating oil and coal-fired electricity will rise for 
schools and other public buildings, just as it will 
                                                 
1 For further discussion of cap-and-dividend policies, see 
Barnes (2008), DeCanio (2008), and capanddividend.org. 
rise for homeowners. The prices of gasoline and 
diesel will rise for the Pentagon and other gov-
ernment agencies, just as it will for private citi-
zens. To “keep the government whole” – to 
compensate for these higher costs and to main-
tain real government spending at current levels – 
revenues will need to grow by a corresponding 
amount. 
In this paper, we analyze two policy options for 
addressing the impacts of a cap-and-dividend 
program on government: 
• Distribute 100% of revenue to individuals as 
taxable dividends: In our calculations we as-
sume that dividends are subject to federal 
and state income taxes at the same rate as 
ordinary income, and that dividends are 
spent by households and hence subject to 
state sales tax. We find that 24.2% of divi-
dends (on average) would be returned to the 
federal and state governments under this 
option, an amount sufficient to keep the 
government whole in that it compensates for 
the impact of higher fossil fuel prices on gov-
ernment purchasing power. 
• Revenue set aside for government, coupled 
with tax-free dividends to individuals: An al-
ternative policy option is to earmark a frac-
tion of the carbon revenue (that is, the 
revenue from sale of permits) for govern-
ments, rather than recycling 100% of this 
revenue to the public. In this option, divi-
dends to individuals would be treated as tax-
free. To facilitate comparison of the two op-
tions, we assume that the set-aside is cali-
brated to keep the government share of 
total carbon revenue the same as under the 
first option. 
We examine the distributional impacts of both 
policy options by dividing the U.S. population into 
ten deciles, ranked from poorest to richest on the 
basis of per capita expenditure. As in Boyce and 
The price impacts of a carbon cap will 
be felt not only by consumers, but also 
by governments. 
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Riddle (2007), our calculations are based on a 
permit price of $200 per ton of carbon, a price 
that we estimate would result from an initial cap 
that cuts U.S. carbon emissions by approximately 
7%. We estimate that this cap and price would 
yield annual carbon revenues of roughly $300 
billion/year. 
What will happen as the carbon cap tightens in 
successive years, moving towards the much 
greater emissions reductions now endorsed by 
an increasing number of policy makers?2 As the 
quantity of permits (and emissions) falls, their 
price will rise. The percentage increase in prices 
being larger than the percentage decrease in 
quantity of permits (because demand for fossil 
fuels is price-inelastic), total revenue will rise, too. 
This will increase the magnitude of the distribu-
tional effects reported below, but not their pat-
tern: with a doubling of total carbon revenues, for 
example, the net benefits for low-income and 
middle-income households double, as do the net 
costs for high-income households. 
“KEEPING THE GOVERNMENT WHOLE”  
What share of revenue from the sale of carbon 
permits would be required to keep government 
whole, that is, to offset the effects of the cap-and-
permit policy on the balance between govern-
ment expenditures and government revenues, 
with “government” here taken to encompass 
federal, state and local governments? 
The most evident effect of a cap-and-dividend 
policy (or for that matter, of any policy that in-
cludes a cap on carbon emissions) on govern-
ment is to raise the cost of government’s own 
consumption of fossil fuels and everything that 
uses these fuels in its production and distribu-
tion. Table 1 presents estimates of government 
carbon consumption, based on government ex-
penditure patterns and input-output data on the 
fossil fuel content of the various categories of 
                                                 
2 President-elect Barack Obama, for example, has endorsed 
the goal of cutting U.S. emissions 80% from the 1990 level 
by the year 2050. In California, the same goal was estab-
lished on June 1, 2005, by Governor Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger’s Executive Order S-3-05 (for this and other state-level 
policy targets, see Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
2008). 
expenditure.3 Government expenditure ac-
counted for 14.5% of the nation’s “carbon foot-
print” in the year 2002.4 This is close to the 
estimate of Dinan and Rogers (2002, p. 205), 
who put the government share of U.S. carbon 
emissions in 1998 at 13%.  
State and local government accounted for 10.8% 
of total U.S. carbon emissions, and federal gov-
ernment for 3.6%. These percentages are smaller 
than their shares in expenditure: the carbon in-
tensity of public expenditure is less than that of 
private consumption, reflecting the higher pro-
portion of services (e.g., salaries) in the govern-
ment consumption basket.5 
In addition to the impact of increased costs due 
to higher fossil fuel prices, the introduction of 
carbon permits could have indirect impacts on 
the balance between government expenditure 
and revenue. These include increases in gov-
ernment transfer payments (e.g., for Social Secu-
rity benefits and federal pensions) that are 
indexed to prices, and reduced personal income 
tax collections as a result of the indexing of ex-
emptions and tax brackets. Dinan and Rogers 
(2002, p. 211) estimate that each of these would 
have impacts roughly equivalent to a further 7% 
of carbon revenue. If so, adding these to the di-
rect effects of higher fuel prices on government 
purchasing power would mean that 28% of total 
carbon revenues will be needed to keep the gov-
ernment whole.6 
                                                 
3 Breakdowns of government expenditures by industrial 
sector are taken from 2002 benchmark input-output ac-
counts.  Carbon emissions from coal, oil and natural gas are 
based on Energy Information Administration data.  Carbon 
emissions associated with each industrial sector are calcu-
lated by following the use of coal, oil, and natural gas 
through the economy using input-output accounts. For de-
tails on sources, see notes to Table 1. 
4 This includes emissions from government consumption, 
plus a fraction of emissions attributable to investment ex-
penditure (with the fraction equal to the share of govern-
ment consumption in economy-wide non-investment 
expenditure). 
5 Government expenditure here refers to spending on goods 
and services, and excludes transfer payments (such as 
Social Security) which constitute part of household income. 
6 Dinan and Rogers (2002) also add small impacts imputed 
to “deadweight losses” and the tax impact of reduced GDP 
growth, arriving at total net effects on government equiva-
lent to 29.6% of carbon revenue. Both adjustments are 
KEEPING THE  GOVERNMENT  WHOLE  /  BOYCE  &  R IDDLE  /  PAGE  3 
 
These indirect impacts could be offset, however, 
by the recycling of carbon revenue to the public 
under a cap-and-dividend policy. Payment of 
equal per capita dividends acts as a substitute 
for indexing transfer payments in response to 
policy-induced fuel price increases, as both are 
intended to insulate households from the impact 
of the price increases on their real incomes. And 
if the dividends are treated as taxable income, 
this will augment tax revenues. 
A comprehensive strategy to promote energy 
efficiency and the transition to clean energy 
sources would likely include public investments, 
in addition to the cap on carbon emissions. Add- 
                                                                     
open to question: the “welfare losses” ignore the welfare 
gains which are the rationale for a carbon policy in the first 
place; and there is no consensus as to the magnitude or 
even the sign of the effects of a carbon policy on GDP 
growth.  
 
 
ing funding “to provide for increased government 
expenditure on research and development and 
other measures to address climate change,” 
Burtraw et al. (2008, p. 26) take 35% as the 
share of carbon revenue to be allocated to the 
government budget. In a separate paper (Boyce 
and Riddle 2008) we discuss policy options for 
funding public investment in support of the en-
ergy transition. In this paper we focus on the nar-
rower question of how to maintain government 
purchasing power at current levels. 
ALLOCATING CARBON REVENUE 
AMONG FEDERAL,  STATE ,  AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Whatever fraction of total carbon revenues is 
recycled to government, a key issue will be how 
to allocate these revenues among federal, state, 
and local governments. This is particularly impor-
tant in the case of local governments, which typi-
TAB LE  1:  GOVERNMENT  A ND  PR I V A TE  SHARES  OF  U.S .  C ARBON  EMISS I ONS  (2002)  
Sector Share of expenditure (%) Carbon intensity 
(kgCO2/$) 
Share of carbon 
emissions (%) 
Government: Total 19.0 0.43 14.5 
Federal government  6.5 0.31  3.6 
Defense  4.2 0.31  2.3 
Other  2.3 0.32  1.3 
State & local government 12.5 0.49 10.8 
Education  5.4 0.48  4.6 
Other  7.1 0.50  6.2 
Private: Total 72.4 0.57 73.5 
Household consumption 64.6 0.57 65.7 
Non-profit institutions  7.7 0.57  7.8 
Exports  8.8 0.78 12.0 
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Carbon intensity computed following the input-output methodology of Metcalf (1999). Emissions 
from investment expenditure are allocated across sectors based on expenditure shares. 
Sources:  
US Bureau of Economic Analysis, "2002 Standard Make and Use Tables at the Summary Level", available at 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_benchmark.htm. 
Non-profit share of household consumption taken from data cited in Garner et al. (2006). 
Additional data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA): 
Carbon emissions: “International Energy Annual 2005” (available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html).  
Crude oil consumption: “Petroleum Navigator, US Crude Oil Supply and Deposition” (available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_crdsnd_adc_mbbl_a.htm). 
Crude oil use by refineries: “Petroleum Navigator; Refining & Processing; Weekly Inputs, Utilization & Production” (available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_wiup_dcu_nus_w.htm). 
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cally do not levy income taxes or sales taxes and 
hence lack any automatic mechanisms to obtain 
revenues under a cap-and-dividend policy. 
There are two stages to this problem. The first is 
how to allocate carbon revenues across the three 
levels of government: federal, state, and local. 
The second is how to allocate revenues among 
the 50 states, and within states among local 
governments. 
With regard to the first stage, one possible alloca-
tion rule is to apportion the government share of 
carbon revenue across the three levels of gov-
ernment in proportion to their respective total 
expenditures on goods and services. Based on 
the expenditure shares reported in Table 1, this 
would translate into roughly 34% of the govern-
ment carbon-revenue pool being allocated to the 
federal government, and the remaining 66% to 
state and local governments. This allocation rule 
does not take into account differences in the 
carbon intensity of expenditure across the three 
levels of government. But as shown in the table, 
state and local government expenditures tend to 
be more carbon-intensive than federal expendi-
tures. An alternative rule is to apportion carbon 
revenue across the three levels of government in 
proportion to their carbon emissions, that is, in 
proportion to the extent to which the carbon cap 
will raise their operating costs. Under this alloca-
tion rule, the federal share of government carbon 
revenue would be 24% and the state and local 
share would be 76%. 
With regard to the second-stage problem – allo-
cation across the 50 states and across local gov-
ernments – the revenue-sharing formula should 
provide incentives for governments themselves 
to improve their energy efficiency and invest in 
clean energy. In the same way that the cap-and-
dividend policy creates incentives for consumers 
and private-sector firms to reduce their use of 
fossil fuels, state and local governments should 
be given incentives to do the same. This implies 
that inter-state and inter-locality revenue alloca-
tion should not simply be based on carbon use. 
One possible rule is to allocate revenue on the 
basis of population – that is, on an equal per 
capita basis – a formula consistent with the cap-
and-dividend logic of distributing dividends to 
households on an equal per capita basis. 
OPTION 1 :  DISTRIBUTE 100% OF 
REVENUE TO INDIVIDUALS AS TAXABLE 
DIV IDENDS  
One option is to recycle all of the carbon revenue 
to households as individual dividends. With a 
carbon permit price of $200/ton carbon, the 
dividends would amount to $1161/person/year. 
Assuming these are treated as ordinary income, 
we estimate that 24.2% of dividend payments 
would return to government in the form of federal 
and state income taxes and state sales taxes.7 
Federal income taxes account for 18.1% of this 
amount; state income and sales taxes account 
for the remainder.8 
Tax rates vary by income class, of course, so not 
all households will return 24.2% of their divi-
dends to government. We estimate that the 
share of dividends claimed by taxes would range 
from 10.2% in the poorest decile to 39.7% in the 
top decile. 
                                                 
7 Federal income tax rates were calculated using data from 
the Internal Revenue Service (2006) that show an average 
statutory marginal tax rate of 13%. Following calculations by 
the Congressional Budget Office (2005), we incorporate 
effects of tax-code provisions that increase the average 
marginal rate to 14%, and the effect of the 2010 expiry of 
temporary tax cuts which further increases the average 
marginal rate to 16.7%.  Adjusting for the fact that carbon 
dividend payments would be unearned income (analogous 
to rental income), and hence not subject to the provisions of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit or the refundable portion of 
the Child Tax Credit, the average marginal rate on dividends 
rises to 18.1%. Our estimate for state income and sales 
taxes is based on all-state averages reported by Citizens for 
Tax Justice (1996). 
8 The income and sales tax revenues are based solely on the 
dividends received and spent by households. We do not 
include “multiplier effects” on income tax revenues from 
firms.  
A key issue is how to allocate carbon 
revenues among federal, state, and  
local governments. 
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The distributional impact of this policy option is 
reported in Table 2. Because a cap-and-dividend 
policy “charges” households (via higher prices for 
fossil fuels) in proportion to their carbon con-
sumption, higher-expenditure households gener-
ally pay more than lower-expenditure 
households. Dividends are paid equally to all. In 
other words, people pay based on their use of the 
Earth’s carbon-absorptive capacities, and receive 
dividends based on the principle that the result-
ing revenue belongs equally to all. Richer house-
holds pay more than they receive, while poorer 
households receive more than they pay. 
The bottom seven deciles come out ahead, in the 
sense that what they receive in dividends ex-
ceeds what they pay as a result of higher fuel 
prices. There are two reasons why the number of 
“winners” – here defined in purely monetary 
terms, without taking into account the benefits 
from curbing global warming – outnumber the 
“losers” by roughly a 2:1 margin. First, expendi-
ture is skewed to the top of the income distribu-
tion (put differently, average expenditure is 
greater than median expenditure). Second, the 
after-tax share of total carbon revenues retained 
by households (75.8%) is greater than the 
household share of carbon emissions and hence 
carbon charges (65.7%, as reported in Table 1). 
At the same time, this policy option keeps the 
government whole in the sense that the govern-
ment share of carbon revenue that is recouped 
via taxes on dividends (24.2%) exceeds the gov-
ernment share of carbon emissions (14.5%). In-
deed, it does so by a margin that is large enough 
to compensate for at least some of the effects of 
indexation of transfer payments and tax brackets 
on government revenue (if these were not ad-
dressed via other policies), and/or to fund gov-
ernment spending that complements the cap-
and-dividend policy by investing in energy effi-
ciency and renewable energy sources. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the reason that both 
government and households can come out 
ahead is that there are two additional sources of 
carbon revenue: non-profit institutions and buy-
ers of U.S. exports, who like households and gov-
ernment pay higher prices for fossil fuels (and for 
everything that is produced and distributed by 
using them) but receive no compensation.9 
                                                 
9 The calculations reported here assume that imports are 
subject to “carbon tariffs” equivalent to the carbon permit 
charges that are embodied in the prices of domestically 
produced goods and services. If no carbon tariffs are levied 
on imported goods (or, for administrative simplicity, they are 
levied only on the high-carbon subset of imported goods), 
this will correspondingly decrease both the charge to con-
TAB LE  2:  D I S TR I BU T I ONA L  IMPAC T  O F  CA P -AND - D I V I DE ND  PO L I CY   
W I TH  100%  O F  R EVENUE  PA I D  TO  IND I V I D UA LS  A S  TAX AB LE  D I V I DE NDS  
Decile (based 
on per capita 
expenditure) 
Expenditure 
per capita 
Charge 
(costs from 
higher 
fossil fuel 
prices) per 
capita 
Dividend 
per capita 
Taxes (federal 
+ state) on 
dividends (%) 
Taxes (federal 
+ state) on 
dividends ($) 
Net 
impact 
($) 
Net impact 
(as % of 
expenditure) 
1 1927 269 1161 10.2% 119 773 40.1% 
2 3521 405 1161 10.8% 125 631 17.9% 
3 4736 493 1161 17.6% 205 464 9.8% 
4 5991 589 1161 21.2% 246 326 5.4% 
5 7380 653 1161 25.1% 291 217 2.9% 
6 8847 732 1161 26.4% 306 123 1.4% 
7 10711 823 1161 26.6% 309 30 0.3% 
8 13228 938 1161 28.2% 328 -104 -0.8% 
9 17178 1139 1161 36.5% 424 -402 -2.3% 
10 29943 1639 1161 39.7% 460 -938 -3.1% 
Average 10346 768 1161 24.2% 281 112 1.1% 
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In other words, the additional government reve-
nue resulting from 100% recycling of carbon 
revenues as taxable dividends to individuals 
would be sufficient to keep the government 
whole. We again note, however, that in this as 
any other policy option, a mechanism for inter-
governmental allocation will be needed to allo-
cate the government share of carbon revenues 
equitably among local, state, and federal gov-
ernments. 
OPTION 2 :  REVENUE SET ASIDE  
FOR GOVERNMENT,  AND TAX-FREE 
DIV IDENDS TO INDIVIDUALS 
A second option is to set aside carbon revenue 
for government to offset the policy’s impact on 
government expenditure, returning the remainder 
to the public as tax-free dividends. To facilitate 
comparison of the two options, we assume in our 
calculations that government again receives 
                                                                     
sumers and amount that households receive as dividends, 
leaving average net benefits unchanged. 
24.2% of the total carbon revenue (primarily via 
the set aside, with a small amount also coming 
from sales taxes as households spend their divi-
dends) and the remaining 75.8% goes to house-
holds.10 The distributional impact of this policy is 
shown in Table 3. 
Under this option, the bottom seven deciles again 
come out ahead in purely monetary terms. The 
net gains for the lower deciles are somewhat 
lower, however, as are the net costs for the upper 
deciles, so the distributional incidence is some-
what less progressive. The difference arises from 
how the government share is financed. In the 
previous option, the fraction of dividends re-
turned to government via taxes varies across the 
deciles, with a higher fraction for more affluent 
households. In the set-aside scenario, each per-
son’s dividend is cut by the same amount – a 
policy that is, in effect, equivalent to a head tax. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Any policy that puts a cap on carbon emissions 
will increase the prices of fossil fuels, with signifi-
cant impacts on local, state, and federal govern-
ments as well as on consumers. This is true 
                                                 
10 The calculations presented here differ from those in our 
earlier paper (Boyce and Riddle 2007), mainly because 
there only 67% of total carbon revenue was recycled to 
individuals. 
The additional government revenue  
resulting from 100% recycling of carbon 
revenues as taxable dividends to  
individuals would be sufficient to keep 
the government whole. 
TAB LE  3:  D I S TR I BU T I ONA L  IMPAC T  O F  CA P -AND - D I V I DE ND  PO L I CY   
W I TH  R EVENUE  SE T  AS I DE  FOR  GOV ERNMENT  
Decile (based 
on per capita 
expenditure) 
Expenditure 
per capita 
Charge 
(costs from 
higher fossil 
fuel prices) 
per capita 
Dividend 
per capita 
Taxes (federal 
+ state) on 
dividends (%) 
Taxes (federal 
+ state) on 
dividends ($) 
Net impact 
($) 
Net impact 
(as % of 
expenditure) 
1 1927 254 919 4.4% 40 624 32.4% 
2 3521 390 919 4.4% 40 488 13.9% 
3 4736 486 919 4.4% 40 393 8.3% 
4 5991 586 919 4.4% 40 293 4.9% 
5 7380 654 919 4.4% 40 225 3.0% 
6 8847 733 919 4.4% 40 145 1.6% 
7 10711 825 919 4.4% 40 54 0.5% 
8 13228 941 919 4.4% 40 -62 -0.5% 
9 17178 1149 919 4.4% 40 -270 -1.6% 
10 29943 1649 919 4.4% 40 -770 -2.6% 
Average 10346 767 919 4.4% 40 112 1.1% 
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regardless of whether the permits (that is, the 
allocation of rights to emit under the cap) are 
given away or auctioned to polluters, and regard-
less of whether auction revenues are retained by 
the government, recycled to the public, or any 
mix of the two. Higher prices are the corollary of 
scarcity, and scarcity (compared to the situation 
with no carbon cap) is precisely what the policy is 
intended to create. 
Households can be made whole, in the sense 
that what the public at large pays in higher fuel 
prices is recycled back to the public, by a cap-
and-dividend policy: individuals win or lose in 
monetary terms from the policy depending on 
whether they consume above-average or below-
average amounts of carbon. To keep the gov-
ernment whole, as well, similar policies are 
needed to ensure that enough of the carbon 
revenues flow to governments to compensate for 
the additional costs they incur as a result of the 
carbon cap and consequent fuel price increases. 
In this paper, we compared the distributional 
impacts of two alternative policies: (i) distributing 
all of the carbon revenue to households as tax-
able dividends, and (ii) setting aside part the car-
bon revenue for government, while distributing 
the remainder of the revenue to the public as tax-
free dividends. Both policies protect the real in-
comes of the majority of American households 
and have a progressive impact on the distribution 
of income. The policy of recycling 100% of carbon 
revenue to the public as taxable dividends has a 
stronger progressive impact. 
Apart from recycling a sufficient total quantity of 
carbon revenues to government, a further issue 
is how to allocate these monies amongst federal, 
state, and local governments, by means of a for-
mula that is fair and provides incentives for gov-
ernments to curb their own carbon emissions. 
We have suggested a two-step allocation rule for 
this purpose: first, to apportion the revenue 
amongst the three levels of government – fed-
eral, state, and local – according to their respec-
tive shares in GDP; and second, within the state 
and local-government shares, to allocate revenue 
on the basis of population. 
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